Authoritarian Regimes and War

It seems an age ago, but back in March 2022, at the start of Russia’s ‘special operation’ against Ukraine, I wrote an article in response to a question I had been asked: 'Was there a clear anthropological theory for the evolution of war?' The answer appeared to be that while our primate heritage provides a capacity for coalitionary aggression, the widespread appearance of organised, lethal warfare belongs more to cultural innovation, which may have been triggered by a powerful combination of sedentism, resource accumulation, and specific social structures (through the Neolithic Revolution), and has since been continually transformed by the expansion of complex states. (https://timboatswain.wixsite.com/website/post/war-and-evolution).

Because of recent events and a conversation I had with an ex-neighbour, I found myself looking at the literature as to what sort of political structure was most likely to lead to war. What can be demonstrated by the data is that authoritarian regimes are statistically more likely to initiate international conflicts, but the reasons vary significantly depending on the specific type of authoritarian government. Political science research suggests that not all authoritarian regimes are equally aggressive, and the key variable is how power is structured within the regime itself.

The most dangerous type of authoritarian regime, when it comes to initiating war, is the personalist dictatorship. These are regimes where a single individual has concentrated power in their own hands, eliminating or neutralising all institutional checks on their authority. Understanding why personalist dictators are particularly prone to starting wars requires examining several interconnected factors.

Isolation and distorted information play a crucial role. Having purged all voices that could challenge them, personalist dictators find themselves isolated and out of touch with reality. They surround themselves with sycophants who tell them what they want to hear rather than what they need to know. This creates a dangerous information vacuum where the leader may genuinely believe in unrealistic military outcomes or misunderstand the likely international response to their aggression. Without honest advisors willing to speak truth to power, these leaders operate in an echo chamber that amplifies their worst impulses - does this ring any bells?

Unconstrained decision-making further compounds the danger. Unlike leaders in other types of regimes, whether democracies or institutionalised autocracies with powerful parties or militaries, personalist dictators face minimal domestic constraints. There is no powerful audience that can punish them for foolish decisions.  When no powerful domestic audience exists, the leader's individual preferences and perceptions about the use of force become paramount. This means that the whims, grudges, and miscalculations of a single individual can plunge nations into war without any institutional mechanism to intervene.

Psychological factors also come into play. Personalist rule tends to breed paranoia, grandiosity, and an exaggerated sense of the leader's own importance and capabilities – the qualities of a narcissist. The longer such leaders remain in power, the more detached from reality they often become. Putin's decision to invade Ukraine while sitting isolated at the head of a long, empty table has become an emblematic image of this phenomenon, capturing the loneliness and self-delusion that characterise personalist rule.

Importantly, authoritarian regimes are not a monolith.  Personalist dictatorships pose the highest risk, followed by military juntas, which pose a moderate risk and tend to use the only language they understand – the language of violence (remember Leopoldo Galtieri); party-based regimes pose a lower risk and tend to look before they leap. This explains why, for example, the Soviet Union under Stalin was highly aggressive and unpredictable as a personalist regime, while the later Soviet leadership, dominated by the 'Politburo', was more cautious and calculating as a more institutionalised machine regime.

Beyond the personalist factor, authoritarian regimes may pursue war for several domestic political reasons. War can serve as a powerful tool to divert public attention from economic failures, repression, or elite infighting. A recent analysis of the Iran conflict noted that a regime that is oppressive and violating human rights will tend to be disruptive and destructive in its external dealings.

Authoritarian regimes often lack genuine popular legitimacy and may seek to manufacture it through nationalist fervour stoked by external conflict. Aggressive foreign policy allows them to position themselves as defenders of the nation against external enemies, wrapping themselves in the flag to cover domestic failings. War can also unite fractious elite groups around a common external threat, temporarily suppressing domestic power struggles that might otherwise threaten the regime's stability.

The international environment matters enormously in determining whether authoritarian aggression succeeds or fails. Authoritarian aggression is enabled or constrained by the international response. When the international community fails to impose meaningful consequences for aggression, it emboldens further authoritarian adventurism. Research on Azerbaijan's 2020 attack on Nagorno-Karabakh suggests that the absence of consequences may have indirectly encouraged Russia's later invasion of Ukraine, creating a dangerous pattern of impunity. Conversely, democratic institutions abroad can act as a constraint, but only when democracies maintain coherent foreign policies. The recent dismantling of US conflict prevention and democracy promotion infrastructure (through 'America First') has been identified as a factor that may enable more authoritarian aggression globally, removing deterrents that once constrained reckless behaviour.

Perhaps most concerning for international stability is that personalist authoritarianism is on the rise worldwide. Research shows that the percentage of dictatorships that are personalist increased from twenty-three per cent in 1988 to forty per cent more recently. This trend suggests that the type of authoritarianism most prone to erratic and aggressive foreign policy is becoming more common, with profound implications for global security.

Authoritarian regimes want war for multiple reasons: to consolidate power, distract from domestic failures, unite elites, and project strength. But the greatest danger comes from personalist dictatorships, where one individual's unchecked power, isolation from reality, and psychological peculiarities can lead to decisions that devastate millions. Understanding these dynamics is essential for crafting effective international responses that can deter aggression while addressing its root causes.